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Application of Margin Rules to Tender Offers by
Foreign Investors
by John J. Sullivan*
The highly-leveraged acquisition of U.S. publicly-held corporations
by foreign investors represents a source of perceived discrimination
which contributes to the continuing scrutiny of foreign investment in the
United States. Tender offers made by foreign investors who borrow
abroad from a foreign lender are not generally subject to the margin
rules which govern U.S. citizens borrowing to acquire corporate control.'
In 1970 Congress attempted to remedy this comparative inequity by
making foreign investors who borrow within the United States to
purchase domestic securities subject to margin restrictions. 2 However,
the legislation generally did not reach borrowings by foreign persons
outside the United States for the same purpose. In 1981 Congress consid-
ered, but did not enact, legislation aimed at closing this loophole. 3 The
possibility of future legislation or regulatory enforcement action directed
at foreign lenders raises issues that bear on long-range planning concerns
of foreign investors.
This article examines the applicability of the margin rules to cash
tender offers by foreign investors who borrow abroad to acquire U.S.
publicly-held corporations. The article explains the functioning of the
margin rules, describing specifically how such rules apply to the purchase
of securities when effecting cash tender offers. In addition, the article
identifies the purposes for which the margin regulations were originally
enacted and discusses whether such purposes would be validly served in
extending regulatory coverage to all borrowings by foreign investors ac-
quiring corporate control. Finally, the article reviews whether adding
restrictions on major foreign investments through extending the margin
* Associate, Walter, Constron and Schurtman, P.C., New York, New York; B.A. Yale
University 1974, J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1977.
1 Seegenerally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 7, 48 Stat. 881, 887-88 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976)). Margin rules are inapplicable to foreign lenders and
were not applied to foreign borrowers before 1970. See generally H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4394, 4399.
2 Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 301, 84 Stat. 1118, 1124-25 (1970) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1976)). The accompanying regulations, rather than the Act itself, make all
investors borrowing within the U.S. subject to margin restrictions. See 12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1982).
3 See infra discussion accompanying notes 94-109.
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rules is contrary to the national policy of encouraging foreign
investment.
I. Description of Margin Rules
Margin requirements were adopted primarily in response to the role
that highly-leveraged borrowings played in the market crash of 1929. In
the late 1920s brokers fueled market speculation by making loans to cus-
tomers with little equity required, using the purchased securities as col-
lateral. Banks generally financed these margin accounts maintained by
brokers with loans that were similarly secured by the purchased securi-
ties. The attractiveness of buying large amounts of securities with little
cash increased the number of investors and pushed upward the market
value of the securities. As market prices rose, the credit capabilities of
stockholders, created by a rise in the value of their stockholdings, also
increased. Investors used this enlarged capacity to purchase additional
securities. As market prices spiraled higher, borrowing capacities of in-
vestors increased even further. With these purchases financed almost
completely by credit, a decrease in stock price, even if small, caused lend-
ers to issue a call for additional collateral. Frequently, the leveraged in-
vestor had limited sources of additional income, As a result, brokers sold
some existing collateral to support the margin call. When the market
declined in late 1929 the prevalence of credit buying sparked a chain
reaction in the depreciation of stock values. Margin customers were un-
able to cover decreases in the value of their securities, and forced liquida-
tions further intensified the downward pressure on an already declining
market.
4
The term "margin" refers to an investor's equity; that portion of the
price of securities that the investor deposits. The balance of the purchase
price is borrowed from the lender. In the typical margin transaction, an
investor obtains a loan from a broker, bank, or other lender to finance
the purchase of securities. The loan agreement usually requires the bor-
rower to pledge the purchased securities as collateral for the loan and
permits the lender to sell such securities at the lender's discretion. The
margin rules set the initial limits on the amount of credit that a lender
lawfully can extend to a customer to purchase certain securities.
The initial margin percentage-the ratio of the investor's original
equity to the purchase price of the securities-is determined by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which prescribes a
"maximum loan value" or collateral value for the securities pledged to
secure the loan.5 The current maximum loan value is fifty percent of the
purchase price of the securities, thus securities purchased at $10,000
4 See J. BOGEN & H. KROOSS, SECURITY CREDIT (1960) and Clirnan, Cti Lmiablh y Under
the Credit Regulation Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of /934, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 205
(1978) for a general description of the background of securities credit regulations.
5 Securities Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976).
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would have a loan value of $5,000.6 As a result, the current margin re-
quirement or amount of equity that a borrower must furnish is also fifty
percent. Therefore, an investor who wishes to purchase $10,000 of secur-
ities, securing that purchase with the to-be-purchased securities and with
cash, would be required to supply $5,000 in cash. 7 Alternatively, instead
of securing his investment with cash, the investor could substitute securi-
ties with a market value of $10,000 which would have a loan value of
$5,000. This collateral requirement, levied at the time of purchase, is
termed the "initial margin requirement." 8
In addition to initial margin requirements the investor may be sub-
ject to maintenance margins which ensure that an investor's equity does
not decline below a percentage of the market value of the securities. The
''minimum maintenance margin" is the ratio of the percentage of the
investor's current equity to the market value of the collateral. 9 To illus-
trate, the investor's equity fluctuates to reflect changes in the market
value of the purchased securities. When that equity falls to a certain
level the investor may be subject to a margin call or request for addi-
tional collateral from the particular lender. Although the Federal Re-
serve Board is authorized to specify a minimum maintenance level,10 it
has left the setting of maintenance margin levels to the discretion of the
exchanges and individual creditors. I For example, the New York Stock
Exchange requires member firms to ensure that their customers maintain
a twenty-five percent margin on the stock-secured borrowings. 12 If the
margin falls below that amount, the broker is required to make a margin
call and request that the customer reduce the loan or furnish additional
eligible securities to reduce the loan to the twenty-five percent margin.
13
Creditors other than broker-dealers, such as banks and insurance
companies, generally do not specify quantitative margin requirements,
but do review their loan portfolios to ensure that their loans remain ade-
quately secure. Thus, if an investor purchases $10,000 of stock, furnish-
ing $5,000 in equity, and the value of that stock declines to less than two-
thirds of its original value or less than $6,667, a broker should make a
margin call, while a bank or other lender is likely to demand more collat-
6 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.5, 220.8, 221.4 (1982). Minimum deposits for margin transactions
have varied from a low of 40% (1937-1945) to a high of 100% (1946-1947). 2 L. Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 1245 (1961).
7 Extension of Margin Requirements to Foreign Investors. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, on S 1429 and S 1436, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1981) (statement of Kenneth Garbade, Professor of Economics and Finance,
New York University) (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings).
8 Id. at 90-91.
9 Id. at 92-93. See generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1248-52.
10 Securities Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(b) (1976).
11 Although the Board has not promulgated any maintenance requirements, special rules
govern the withdrawal and substitution of collateral from undermargined accounts. See 12
C.F.R. §§ 220.3(b)(2), 221.1(c) (1982).
12 New York Stock Exchange Rule 431(b), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2431 (1978).
13 Id. at 431(d)(6).
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eral. At that time, the investor's equity will only be $1,667, which is
equal to twenty-five percent of $6,667, the value of the stock. If the cus-
tomer fails to furnish additional collateral or reduce the loan, the lender,
acting under the terms of the loan agreement, generally will sell enough
pledged securities to raise the customer's equity to the minimum level.
The initial margin requirement thus creates an "equity cushion" which
tends to inhibit the forced liquidation of securities.
II. Statutory Background
To prevent the excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying of
securities, Congress enacted section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.14 Sections 7(a) and 7(b) of that statute direct the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System to prescribe "regulations with respect
to the amount of credit that may be initially extended and subsequently
maintained on any security."' 5 Section 7(c) prohibits any member of a
national securities exchange or any broker or dealer from directly or indi-
rectly1 6 extending or maintaining credit, or arranging' 7 for the extension
or maintenance of credit to or for any customer on securities or on collat-
eral other than securities, except in accordance with the rules and regula-
tions of the Federal Reserve Board (hereinafter referred to as Federal
Reserve or Board).' 8 Section 7(d) makes it unlawful for other lenders to
extend or maintain credit or arrange for the extension or maintenance of
credit in contravention of the rules and regulations of the Federal Re-
serve Board. 9
14 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976). In hearings considering the legislation, Governor Black of the
Federal Reserve Board testified as to the Board's willingness to administer the margin regula-
tions as long as it could do so in the public interest and for investor protection:
If it is desired the Board will be glad to undertake the responsibility of the
bill regarding the fixation of marginal requirements upon loans based upon ex-
change equities, whether the loans are made by brokers or banks, provided power
is vested in the Board to handle this subject in the public interest and to the
protection of the investor. This function would usefully supplement the consider-
able powers vested in the Board under the Banking Act of 1933 to prevent the
undue use of credit for speculative purposes and would in the judgment of the
Board furnish effective protection against the economic evils of speculation.
Stock Exchange Regulation.- Hearing before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of
Representatives on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 808 (1934) (statement of Gov.
Eugene R. Black, Governor, Federal Reserve Board).
15 Securities Exchange Act § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1976). The Federal Reserve has
described the term "to extend credit" as a somewhat broader concept than a loan. For example,
the Board has held that a guaranty of a loan may be an extension of credit. 23 Fed. Res. Bull.
717 (1937).
16 Securities Exchange Act § 7(c); 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(c) (1982) (defining "indirectly
secured").
17 Securities Exchange Act § 7(c); 12 C.F.R. § 220.7(a) (1982) (defining "arranging for
loans by others").
18 Securities Exchange Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1976).
19 Id. § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1976).
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III. Regulatory Promulgations
Responding to its statutory mandate, the Board promulgated a reg-
ulatory scheme which placed the burden of compliance on lenders. The
Board promulgated Regulation T, governing the extension of credit by
any broker or dealer, in 1934;20 Regulation U, governing the extension of
credit by "banks," in 1936;2' and Regulation G, governing the extension
of credit by persons other than banks, brokers, or dealers, in 1968.2
Regulation T generally prohibits a regulated broker or dealer from
extending credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying securities ex-
cept where the credit is collateralized by "margin securities," '23 and then
the amount of the loan may not exceed the current margin rate. Thus, a
broker or dealer may extend only "purpose credit,' 24 that is, credit to
purchase margin securities, and may collateralize that loan only with
registered 25 or exempt securities.26 Thus, Regulation T prohibits a bro-
ker from making an unsecured loan or a loan not secured by margin
securities. In addition, with certain limited exceptions, a broker may ar-
range only for the extension of credit on the same terms and conditions
under which he may originally offer such credit. 27 Under Regulation U,
a bank must conform with margin requirements when extending credit
to purchase or carry any "margin stock ' 28 if that borrowing is secured
directly or indirectly 29 by any stock. 30 Thus, banks may extend un-
secured purpose credit or purpose credit secured by collateral other than
stock without restriction, while the extension of such credit by brokers is
regulated or wholly prohibited. 3 1
20 Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1982).
21 Regulation U, id. § 221 (1982).
22 Regulation G, id. § 207 (1982). Regulations G, T and U are companions in the regula-
tory framework; any decision involving one also would have far-reaching implications on the
others. The Second Circuit treats cases arising under one "interchangeably" with those arising
under the others. See Schy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 465 F. Supp. 766, 770 n.12 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (citing Freeman v. Marine Midland Bank-New York, 494 F.2d 1334, 1338 (2d Cir. 1974)).
23 Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(f) (1982) (defining "margin security").
24 The term "purpose credit" refers to credit which is for the purpose, whether immediate,
incidental or ultimate, of purchasing or carrying a margin stock, despite any temporary applica-
tion of funds otherwise. 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(c)(1) (1982). In addition, credit to reduce or retire
an indebtedness incurred to purchase stock margin securities is for the purpose of "carrying"
such securities. Id. § 207.2(c)(2) (1982).
25 Regulation T, id. § 220.2(d) (1982) (defining "registered" securities).
26 Id. § 220.2(g) (1982) (defining "exempted" securities).
27 A broker, however, may arrange (i) extensions of credit that are secured by margin
securities and which comply with Regulation U and (ii) private placements that are not for the
purpose of purchasing or carrying publicly-held securities and which do not violate Regulations
U and G. 12 C.F.R. § 220.7(a).
28 Regulation U, id. § 221.3 (v) (1982) (defining "margin stock").
29 Id. § 221.3(c) (1982) (defining "indirectly secured").
30 Id. § 221.1 (a) (1982).
31 The statutory restrictions on brokers or dealers extend beyond those placed on banks
and other lenders. Congress was concerned with the economic incentive for brokers to create
highly-leveraged accounts which produced high interest changes on the margin loans. In addi-
tion, by generating sales of stock, brokers received a commission on every purchase or sale of
22 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In 1968 the Federal Reserve Board promulgated Regulation G
which provides that a registered lender is subject to the margin rules
when extending credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying "margin
securities" 3 2 which are collateralized, directly or indirectly,33 by such se-
curities.3 4 Regulation G requires that any person other than a broker-
dealer or bank who extends credit in any calendar quarter of $100,000 or
more, or has outstanding during any calendar quarter $500,000 or more
credit, must register with the Federal Reserve if such credit is secured
directly or indirectly by margin securities. 35 The purpose of the regula-
tion was to bring lenders other than banks, brokers, or dealers within the
coverage of the Board's rules governing margin requirements on securi-
ties transactions.3 6 The Board promulgated this regulation to stem ex-
cessive credit from flowing into the securities markets from such "other"
lenders, including foreign lenders.3 7 Regulation G is similar to Regula-
tion U, except that Regulation G only applies to "purpose credits" se-
cured by margin securities while Regulation U covers "purpose credits"
secured by stock.38
The margin regulations clearly apply to acquisition financing. De-
spite arguments that the regulations focus primarily on retail level trans-
actions, the Federal Reserve Board and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) have consistently taken the position that acquisition
financing is subject to the requirements of the margin rules.39 Courts
which have considered the issue have uniformly agreed with the position
of the Board and the SEC.40
IV. Legislative Purpose
Three purposes of margin regulation are recognized: controlling se-
curities as an instrument of national credit policy, minimizing market
fluctuations through price stabilization, and protecting investors.4'
stock by their customers. Congress also believed that bankers were more responsible and gave
greater scrutiny to their borrowers. See generaly 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1259 n.59.
32 Regulation G, 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(d) (1982) (defining "margin security").
33 Id. § 207.2(i) (1982) (defining "indirectly secured").
34 Id. § 207.1(a) (1982).
35 Id. § 207.
36 See 132 Fed. Reg. 14,855 (1967).
:37 See Collateral Lending Comm. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 281 F.
Supp. 899, 909-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
38 Compare Regulation G, 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(c),(d) (1982) with Regulation U, Id.
§ 221.3(b),(d) (1982).
39 See Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.1 10(b)(2) (1982), indicating that the purpose for
acquiring a stock secured loan is not relevant to the applicability of the margin rules. See gener-
ally A.B.A. Comm, on Developments in Business Financing, The Impact of the Federal Reserve
Margin Regulations on Acquisition Financing, 35 Bus. LAw. 517 (1980).
40 See, e.g., Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199, 239 (D. Md.), aed, 546
F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976).
41 Louis Loss, in his treatise on securities regulation, states:
The [Securities Exchange] Act and its legislative history indicate that the credit
provisions rest on three separate philosophies, which are not altogether consistent:
(1) The statute itself speaks in terms of 'preventing the excessive use of credit for
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The primary purpose of margin regulations, as embodied in the stat-
utory language and the legislative history, is directed at selectively con-
trolling securities credit as an instrument of national credit policy.
42
This goal is prominently set forth in the House Report accompanying
the Securities Exchange Act as "to give a Government credit agency an
effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nation's credit
resources which can be directed by speculation into the stock market and
out of more desirable uses of commerce and industry."'43  Although
courts and legal commentators have relied on this language to justify
imposing margin requirements, economists have increasingly questioned
whether limiting the amount of credit-based speculation causes any
channelling of resources into more desirable uses.44  The amount of
credit committed by banks to fund takeover battles has been criticized as
an unproductive diversion of funds.4
5
A more widely accepted theory for the margin rules is that the rules
serve as a regulatory tool in minimizing market fluctuations.46 Although
price stabilization was not originally regarded as the primary purpose of
section 7, Congress subsequently has recognized the contemporary rele-
vance of this goal.47 Under this rationale, the regulations protect against
the purchase or carrying on of securities.' So does the House report. . . .(2) The
report of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee's investigation, on the
other hand, says that the margin provisions are also intended 'to protect the mar-
gin purchaser by making it impossible for him to buy securities on too thin a
margin . . . ' (3) At the same time, Congress apparently had in mind also that
the Board's powers would be used to prevent undue market fluctuations and help
stabilize the economy generally . . . .In the early and most recent years, at least,
the chief emphasis seems to have been placed on this third philosophy.
2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1242-43 (1961).
42 William McChesney Martin, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve, has characterized the regulatory scheme as "a supplemental instrument of credit
policy-one of the means of making a broad credit and monetary policy effective." Joint Corn-
mittee on the Economic Report, Monetaiy Pohcy and the Management of the Public Debt.. Their Role in
Achieving Price Stability and High-Level Employment, S. Doc. No. 123, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 409
(1952).
43 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT ON H.R.
9323, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
44 See, e.g., Moore, Stock Market Margin Requirements, 74 J. POL. ECON. 158, 160-61 (1968);J.
BOGEN & H. KROOSS, supra note 4, at 38-40; Cohen, Federal Reserve Margin Requirements and the
Stock Market, J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL., Sept. 1966, at 30, 53 ("considerable doubt exists about
the effectiveness of margin regulations in controlling the flow of funds into the stock market").
45 See Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 988 (Oct. 13, 1982) (statements by Rep. Henry S.
Reuss, Chairman of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee) referring to an SEC report
indicating that $5.6 billion in lines of credit was made available by 28 major American banks
and II foreign banks in the Martin Marietta-Bendix takeover fight.
46 See REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963). Although an indi-
vidual margin violation is virtually harmless, a forced sale may "put pressures on securities
prices. . .[and] cause other forced sales and the resultant snowballing effects may in turn have
a general adverse effect upon the entire market." d. at 5 (hereinafter cited as SEC Study).
47 The Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970 provides evidence that Con-
gress has been placing greater weight on the goal of market stabilization. Pub. L. No. 91-508,
84 Stat. 1118. In proposing what ultimately became section 7(f) of the Exchange Act, the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking and Currency observed that:
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destabilizing price declines by controlling securities-collateralized
credit. 48 Price stabilization is particularly important in light of the po-
tential rapid increase or decrease of stock prices when tender offers are
made.
Investor protection has been recognized as an objective of section
7() by several leading commentators49 and a number of courts. 50 Courts
have generally denied investors a private right of action for margin viola-
tions. Several decisions have stated that investor protection is a "by-
product" of securities credit enforcement, but not a primary objective of
the regulatory scheme.5' Nevertheless, other courts have stated that
Congress intended investor protection to serve as a primary goal of the
margin regulations. 52
One of the purposes of the margin requirements is to prevent destabilizing
fluctuations in the securities stimulated by the excessive use of margin credit
.... The objective of preventing destabilizing credit flows can be weakened if
U.S. borrowers are free to borrow abroad in excess of the Federal Reserve Board's
margin requirements.
S. REP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
See also Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), where the SEC, as
amicus curiae, advised the court that "the artificial demand created by purchasing securities
which are not to be paid for unless the market value of the stock rises can have an unsettling
and potentially manipulative effect on the securities market, contary to the purposes of the
Act;" Daley v. Capitol Bank and Trust Co., 506 F.2d 1375, 1377 (1st Cir. 1974); Comment,
Applcation cfMargin Requirements to the Cash Tender Offer, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 126-27 (1967)
(effect of margin credit on acquisition financing). But see Largay & West, Margin Changes and
Stock Price Behavior, 81 J. POL. ECON. 328, 338 (1973).
48 SEC Study, supra note 46, at 9. Although such credit "does not enter directly into the
securities stream, it has important market implications because, as prices recede, securities serv-
ing as collateral may be vulnerable to forced sales resulting from margin calls." Id. at 2.,
49 Id. See also Lipton, Some Recent Innovations .o Avoid the Margin Regulations, 46 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1971); Karmel, The Investment Banker and the Credit Regulations, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 59,
61 (1970).
50 Remar v. Clayton Securities, 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949); see cases cited in 5 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3299-3309 (Supp. 1969).
5i See, e.g., Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 603 F.2d 1073, 1088 (4th Cir.
1979).
52 See, e.g., Goldman v. Bank of Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1972); Ser-
zysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Debate on the House
floor reveals that the representatives considered investor protection a fundamental purpose of
the margin provisions. This goal was the basic tenet of the law from the outset. In introducing
the bill, Representative Rayburn, Speaker of the House and Chairman of the House Commit-
tee, declared that a purpose of the House bill was to protect investors from speculating on
insufficient margin and stated that a "[r]easonably high margin is essential so that a person
cannot get in the market on a shoe string one day and be one of the sheared lambs when he
wakes up the next morning." 78 CONG. REC. 7,700 (1934). Other Congressmen shared Repre-
sentative Rayburn's view that the margin provisions were intended to safeguard investors. Dis-
cussing the broader aspects of the bill, Representative Ford remarked: "This bill does three
things. It protects investors, controls market manipulations that are destructive to values, and
tends to curb destructive speculation." 78 CONG. REc. 7,717 (1934). Representative Sabath
likewise stressed investor protection: "I am of the opinion that, in view of the fact that we
cannot, . . . prohibit speculation or gambling, that it is our duty to see that the investing pub-
lic, or rather the 'lambs,' be protected by this Government so that their investments shall not be
wiped out even before the receipt of the stock certificates issued to them." 78 CONG. REC. 8,011
(1934).
Testimony before the Senate committee also refuted the argument that section 7 was
passed solely to effectuate broad macro-economic policy. For example, Mr. Thomas Corcoran,
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The responsibility for interpreting, amending, and monitoring the
effectiveness of the margin provisions rests with the Federal Reserve, 53
while the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the principal
enforcement agency. The statutory scheme of enforcement includes ad-
ministrative action, injunctive relief, and criminal sanctions. The SEC is
empowered to sue in federal district court for injunctions against viola-
tions of the Act.54 Both the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board may
transmit evidence of violations to the Attorney General for the institu-
a leading spokesman for the drafters, emphasized the dual purposes of the provisions: "One is
to protect the lamb; another, and probably the more important of the two, although it does not
appeal to human instincts as completely, is the protection of the national business system from
the fluctuations in the market." Stock Exchange Practices. Hearing before the Comm. on Banking and
Currency, United States Senate, on S. Res. 84 and S Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6494
(1934). The Senate committee report accompanying the Act further demonstrated concern for
individual investors: "By the development of the margin account, a great many people have
been induced to embark upon speculative ventures in which they were doomed to certain loss."
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). Since the House and Senate bills differed, they
were sent to a Senate-House conference committee. The resulting compromise bill did not con-
tain any inference as to the purposes of the credit regulation provisions. Although the confer-
ence report accompanying the bill spells out point-by-point the differences between the Senate
and House bills, it does not mention the margin regulation purposes. Had any disagreements
emerged between the Senate and House conferees as to those purposes, such differences would
logically have surfaced in the conference report. Furthermore, the Senate Committee Report,
released ten days after the passage of the Act, stands as the most reliable source of Senate intent
toward the purposes of the margin regulations. In articulating the purposes of the credit regula-
tions, this report confirmed that investor protection was not a mere by-product of the margin
regulations, but was a coordinate purpose of the regulatory scheme: "These provisions are in-
tended to protect the margin purchaser by making it impossible for him to buy securities on too
thin a margin, and to vest the Government credit agency with power to reduce the aggregate
amount of the Nation's credit resources which can be directed by speculation into the stock
market." S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
53 S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). In addition to section 7, additional
statutory provisions impact on the Board's authority to regulate securities credit. Section 17(g)
of the Act obliges lenders subject to the margin regulations to "make such reports to the Board
as it may require as necessary or appropriate to enable it to perform the functions conferred
upon it . . ." and "to permit such inspections to be made by the Board ... as the Board may
deem necessary to enable it to obtain the required information." 15 U.S.C. § 78q(g) (1976).
Under section 23(a) of the Act, the Federal Reserve is empowered "to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter for
which they are responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in them by this chapter
. .. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a). Section 23(b) requires the Federal Reserve to "make an annual
report to Congress on its work for the preceding year" and to include in the report "whatever
information, data and recommendations for further legislation it considers advisable with re-
gard to matters within its respective jurisdiction under this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 78w(b). Sec-
tion 8(b)(l) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act authorizes the Federal Reserve and other
federal banking agencies to issue cease and desist orders to insured banks "when the agency has
reasonable cause to believe that the bank is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound practice in
conducting the business of such banks, or is violating or has violated. . . or is about to violate a
law, rule, or regulation .... " 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1976). The procedure for such action
by the Federal Reserve against banks under its supervision is outlined in 12 C.F.R. § 263 (1982).
The Federal Reserve's regulatory structure also has relied in the past upon the existence of
private causes of action in implementing its statutory obligations. The threat of a private suit
has been regarded by the Federal Reserve as a necessary inducement to strict compliance by
lenders subject to the margin rules. See Brief of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Stern v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 603 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1979).
54 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c)-(e) (1976).
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tion of criminal proceedings. 55 In addition, the SEC may initiate admin-
istrative proceedings to revoke a broker-dealer's registration5 6 or suspend
or expel him from an exchange or from the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers (NASD).5 7 Further, the 1934 Act provides that securities
exchanges must enact rules for disciplining members before registering
with the SEC. 58 The NASD has also promulgated rules, such as those
demanding minimal initial and maintenance margin requirements of its
members. 59 For violations of these rules, members of the NASD may be
penalized by censure, fine, suspension, or expulsion. 60
Historically, the SEC has construed broadly its jurisdiction over for-
eign lenders in the area of margin regulations. 6' The SEC has argued
that it has jurisdiction over a securities transaction if such transaction has
an effect on the national interest. 62 Under the existing scheme regulating
securities credit, the SEC has adopted the view that borrowing abroad
which has a significant impact on the United States securities market
should be subject to the margin rules.63
V. Section 7(f)
The applicability of margin regulations to foreign lenders surfaced
as an issue in 1968 in Metro-Goldwyn-Mejer v. Transamerica Corp. 64 That
case involved a highly publicized takeover attempt by Kirk Kerkorian, a
well-known speculative investor. 65 Credit for the takeover was financed
almost exclusively abroad by Eurodollar borrowings from international
banks.66 MGM, the target company, argued that the proposed acquisi-
tion financing from such foreign lenders violated Regulations G and T
and that, as a result, the tender offer was illegal. 6 7 The court rejected the
argument that such foreign lenders were subject to existing margin re-
strictions, stating that "[n]othing contained in the 1934 Act-nor in any
of the Regulations promulgated thereunder, including Regulation G-in
any way indicates an attempt or intent to regulate the acts of foreign
55 Id. § 78u(d).
56 15 U.S.C § 78o(4) (1976).
57 Id. §§ 78o-3(a)(7), 78s(a)(3) (1976). The National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) is a self-regulatory organization created by a 1938 amendment to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Many, but not all, broker-dealer firms are members of the NASD, which is
registered with the SEC pursuant to law.
58 Id. § 78f(b)(6), (7); § 78o-3(b)(7) (1976).
59 National Association of Securities Dealers Manual (CCH) 2180A.
60 Id. 2301. See also L. LOLL & J. BUCKLEY, THE OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES
MARKETS 221 (1967).
61 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. dentedsub. nor. Manley v.
Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
62 SEC Study, supra note 46, at 39.
63 See Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 39-53 (statement of Philip Loomis).
64 303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
65 Id. at 1346.
66 Id. at 1354.
67 Id. at 1356.
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lending institutions."'68
In 1970 Congress enacted Title III of the Bank Records and Foreign
Transactions Act of 1970, amending section 7 of the Exchange Act to
provide, for the first time, regulation of borrowers in margin transac-
tions. 69 The legislative history reveals that Congress, reacting to the de-
68 Id. at 1357.
69 Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 301(a), 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78g()
(1976)). A salient result of the enactment of section 7(f) has been the reversal of judicial prece-
dent granting investors a private right of action for margin regulations. The congressional in-
tent in section 7() of applying the margin rules to borrowers has been reviewed by several
courts. Significantly, courts which previously granted borrowers a private right of action have
virtually eliminated the availability of such an implied remedy. Prior to section 7(l), courts had
implied a private cause of action in favor of investors. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & Cerman,
429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). Although designed primarily to
curb evasion by lenders not subject to domestic controls, the effect of section 7(l) in promoting
the regulatory scheme has been to apply the margin rules to borrowers. See Panayotopulas v.
Chemical Bank, 464 F. Supp. 199, 202-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Certain courts, focusing on the
express language of the amendment, reconsidered prior decisions and rejected the rationale of
imposing absolute liability on the broker. See, e.g., Pearlstein, 527 F.2d 1411, 1145 n.3 (2d Cir.
1975) (on appeal from remand, past holding "questioned" in light of passage of § 7(l); Palmer v.
Thomson & Mckinnon Auchincloss, 427 F. Supp. 915 (D. Conn. 1977). Recognizing that sec-
tion 7(f) places compliance responsibility on investors, these courts restored the in par" delicto
defense, thus restricting the class of beneficiaries to innocent investors. See Palmer, 474 F. Supp.
286, 289 (D. Conn. 1979). Other courts, however, have rejected the entire theory that investors
are entitled to an implied right of action. See, e.g., Utah State Univ. of Agriculture and Applied
Science v. Bear, Stearns, & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1978).
Significantly, the amendment specifically authorized the Federal Reserve to exempt any
class of regulated borrowers from application of the statute. Securities Exchange Act § 7()(3),
15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(3) (1976). The House committee report reflected this congressional intent to
give administrative flexibility to the Federal Reserve "to fashion requirements and conditions
with which compliance can reasonably be expected as well as practicably can be enforced." In
this regard the stated purpose of Regulation X is:
[To] prevent the infusion of unregulated credit obtained both outside and within
the United States into U.S. securities markets in circumvention of the provisions
of the Board's margin regulations or by borrowers falsely certifying the purposes
of a loan or otherwise wilfully and intentionally evading the provisions of those
regulations.-
12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1980). Regulation X, in general, makes it unlawful to obtain credit that
contravenes Regulation G, T, or U, except where the borrower makes an "innocent mistake"
and takes corrective action promptly. Id. §§ 224.2, .6.
Responsibility placed on the lender by the enactment of section 7(f) should not have been
eroded by the promulgation of Regulation X. A Board letter dated November 1, 1971, the
effective date of the Regulation, stated:
[Slince persons who deal with financial institutions such as banks, brokers, or
dealers, can be expected to rely upon the institution for guidance in matters af-
fecting the transactions it appears that the most efficient way of making the pub-
lic aware of Regulation X will be by asking lenders to inform borrowers prior to
or concurrently with a transaction in which securities credit is extended.
Letter from the Federal Reserve Board to District Federal Reserve Banks (Nov. 1, 1971). This
language indicates that borrowers generally rely on the lenders to learn about the margin re-
quirements and that lenders continue to act as the primary source of compliance. A Federal
Reserve pamphlet distributed to banks and broker-dealers as an education effort aimed at mar-
gin investors states: "Banks, broker-dealers and many other lenders also have copies of the
Regulation X or are familiar with its provisions. Ask your banker or brokers about them."
Federal Reserve Board, If You Borrow to Buy Stock - (19-). Other courts and commentators
have suggested that since the legislative history of section 7(l) does not reveal any intention to
overrule existing case law, Congress did not intend to remove from the investor any protection
previously available to him. Soloman & Hart, Recent Developments in the Regulation ofSecurities
28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
cision in MGM and influenced by additional indications of securities-
related borrowing abroad, acted to prevent the infusion into the United
States securities market of unregulated credit. Both the Senate and
House reports connected with the Act refer to the MGM decision. The
Senate Report stated:
Under a recent decision of a United States District Court, it has been
determined that the margin requirements authorized under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 apply only to United States lenders and not to
United States borrowers . . . . If this interpretation is correct, a United
States borrower can easily circumvent the margin requirements by bor-
rowing from a foreign lender.
70
In addition, the House Committee on Banking and Currency noted:
Americans and others, using the facade of secret foreign banks, can
purchase securities in our markets ignoring the Federal Reserve Board's
regulations on margin requirements and for the purpose of evading the
income taxes. American companies are subject to takeovers or the ac-
quisition of substantial interests by those about whom little or nothing is
known. Criminal elements infiltrate and control substantial segments of
American businesses through securities purchases and financing by se-
cret foreign sources. Several of the recent corporate takeovers and ac-
quisitions have involved security considerations in that defense
contractors or other sensitive American industries became the target.
7 1
These reports reflect that, at the least, Congress intended to regulate ac-
quisition financing obtained from outside the United States by subject-
ing U.S. borrowers to domestic controls. As originally drafted, the
legislation contained no reference to margin regulations. 72 The Act itself
was the product of congressional concern that white-collar criminals
were utilizing financial institutions for a variety of illegal purposes and
was intended primarily to correct the "serious abuses associated with the
Credit, 20J. PUB. L. 167, 209 (1971); Palmer, 427 F. Supp. 915 (D. Conn. 1977). In Palmer, the
court, finding that Regulation X implies that only borrowers who "falsely," "willfully," or "in-
tentionally" evade the provisions of the Act are subject to its sanctions, the court concluded that
no reason existed to deprive a good faith borrower of a cause of action particularly since such
suits aid in enforcement of statutory prohibitions. 427 F. Supp. at 921. In Neill v. David A.
Noyes & Co., 416 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Il. 1976), another federal district court concluded that
enforcement-based arguments for allowing civil recoveries retain their persuasiveness:
Despite some recent changes in section 7, . . . the Pearlsteih doctrine remains via-
ble .... Innocent investors . . . continue to possess a valid cause of action for
violations of margin requirements. The overall purposes of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 are best met by allowing this type of cause of action to
continue.
416 F. Supp. at 80. Other courts have failed to distinguish between innocent and culpable
investors. E.g., Utah, 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1977) (no private right of action allowed), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1978). It should be noted that in certain decisions, by reaching the merits
of the borrowers' claims, courts have implicitly acknowledged the continuing availability of a
private action in the proper circumstances.
70 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK SECRECY AND BANK RECORD
KEEPING, S. REP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate
report].
71 HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK RECORDS AND FOREIGN TRANS-
ACTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 House
report].
72 Id.
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uses of foreign bank accounts."' 73 When testimony indicated that unreg-
ulated foreign credit contributed to market instability and aided corpo-
rate takeovers, market manipulation, and insider abuse, the House
Committee on Banking and Currency responded by adding Title III as
an amendment to the original bill.74 Summarizing the legislative intent,
Representative Patman, Chairman of the House Committee on Banking
and Currency, stated:
This amendment was found necessary if we were to wholly and com-
pletely deal with the problems created by the use of recent foreign
financial institutions for illegal purposes. Through a simple device of
making the margin requirements applicable to the borrower, as well as
the lender, we will be equipping the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ... with sufficient legal and investigative weapons to require ade-
quate disclosure of foreign financing. 75
The Senate Committee Report considering this proposal likewise
stressed the legislative concern with the increasing use of foreign accounts
by U.S. citizens for illegal activities. 76 The report warned that the objec-
tive of preventing destabilizing credit flows could be weakened if U.S.
borrowers could circumvent U.S. laws by obtaining credit abroad in ex-
cess of the Federal Reserve's margin regulations.7 7 Due to practical diffi-
culties in asserting personal jurisdiction and enforcing judgments over
foreign lenders, Congress focused on the borrower by prohibiting the re-
ceipt of loans by U.S. investors in violation of the margin regulations.
VI. Regulation X
To implement section 7(f) the Board, in 1970, promulgated Regula-
tion X which, for the first time, placed responsibility on the borrower to
observe the margin rules by making it unlawful to obtain "purpose
credit" in violation of Regulations G, T, U or X. 78 Regulation X estab-
lished requirements for those borrowers who are subject to the margin
rules and are obtaining purpose credit from within or outside the United
States. The regulation applies to any borrower who obtains purpose
credit from within the United States 79 and to the following borrowers
who obtain purpose credit from outside the United States:
(i) "United States persons"
(ii) foreign persons who are controlled by United States persons, or
(iii) foreign persons "acting on behalf of or in conjunction with"
United States persons.8
0
When structuring a transaction to avoid being subject to the margin
rules, a foreign borrower (1) must obtain credit from outside the United
73 116 CONG. REC. 10,401 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
74 1970 House report, supra note 71, at 14, 24-25.
75 91 CONG. REC. 16,954 (1970) (statement of Rep. Patman).
76 1970 Senate report, supra note 70, at 9-10.
77 Id.
78 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1982).
79 12 C.F.R. § 224.2(a) (1982).
80 12 C.F.R. § 224.2(b) (1982).
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States, and (2) must not be controlled by or "acting in conjunction with"
a U.S. person. However, section 7 and Regulation X provide uncertain
guidance in determining whether credit is obtained from within or with-
out the United States. The Federal Reserve has issued comparatively
few regulatory rulings or opinion letters in interpreting issues under Reg-
ulation X. The absence of clear authority is critical to a foreign investor
when arranging financing for a tender offer which, if subject to margin
restrictions, would require substantial collateral, and the absence of au-
thority may affect that investor's decision to proceed with the offer.
Whether credit is or is not obtained in the United States depends on
the situs of the credit.8 ' The following factors are generally considered
relevant in determining the situs of the credit:
(i) where the loan agreement is signed,
(ii) where the terms of the agreement are negotiated,
(iii) where the loan is booked,
(iv) where the collateral is physically maintained,
(v) whether the parent or subsidiary is the actual source of funds,
(vi) whether any previous credit relationship exists between the borrower
and a parent or subsidiary,
(vii) whether the subsidiary makes loans in the ordinary course of business,
(viii) where activities in arranging and negotiations leading up to the borrow-
ing occur,
(ix) whether such activities involve discussions with officials of the foreign
subsidiary who have the authority to bind the subsidiary.
There is no authority to indicate which of these factors, if any, would be
controlling, or to judge the comparative relevance from any one of the
factors. To ensure that the loan is considered to be from outside the
United States, counsel should be careful that all activity leading up to
the loan, especially the negotiation of its terms, occurs abroad. Under
traditional banking practice in the United States, a loan generally is gov-
erned by the laws of the state where the bank is located.8 2 While this
rule would appear equally applicable to loans involving foreign banks,
domestic policy considerations underlying the margin rules may compete
with this practice and the situs of a margin loan from a foreign bank may
be deemed to be in the United States.
If credit is obtained from outside the United States, a foreign inves-
tor may still be subject to the margin requirements if the borrower is
deemed to be a "U.S. person" or, a foreign person acting on behalf of or
in conjunction with a "United States person."8' 3 A definitional analysis
of these terms is necessary in determining whether the regulatory scheme
encompasses a foreign investor.
Section 7() sets forth statutory definitions relevant in determining
81 Regulation X itself does not define "within" or "outside" the United States. See Federal
Reserve Board staff letter to James F. Verdonik (July 3, 1980) (copy on file in office of N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG.) [hereinafter cited as Letter of July 3, 1980].
82 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308-13 (1978).
83 12 C.F.R. § 224.2(b) (1982).
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what parties are subject to the regulation. The term "United States per-
son" is defined to include "a person which is organized or exists under
the laws of any State or, in the case of a natural person, a citizen or
resident of the United States."'8 4 Clearly the definition includes a domes-
tic subsidiary of a foreign corporation. It is less than clear, however,
whether a resident alien is subject to the regulatory scheme and whether
a person's status as a permanent resident alien is determinative. It would
appear that an individual's citizenship or place of actual residence at the
time the loan agreement was reached would be determinative. Under
such circumstances, an individual who is not a U.S. citizen could avoid
being deemed a "United States person" and thereby evade the margin
requirements simply by avoiding contact with this country during loan
negotiations.
The term "foreign person controlled by a United States person" is
defined by section 7(f) to include:
[A]ny noncorporate entity in which United States persons directly or
indirectly have more than a 50 per centum beneficial interest, and any
corporation in which one or more United States persons, directly or indi-
rectly, own stock possessing more than 50 per centum of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or more than
50 per centum of the total value of shares of all classes of stock.8 5
This provision is designed to prevent U.S. persons from circumventing
the margin rules by simply establishing a foreign corporation to act as
the borrowing vehicle. In a letter interpreting the definition, the staff of
the Federal Reserve Board stated that a foreign corporation in which
U.S. persons own stock having less than fifty percent of the voting power
and less than fifty percent of the value of the shares is not a "foreign
person controlled by a United States person."' 86 It should be noted in
connection with this interpretive letter that section 7(f), in defining
"United States person," uses the term "includes" while in defining
"United States security" the term "means" is used. Section 7(f) may thus
be interpreted to provide that a foreign entity located abroad may be
subject to the margin rules under certain circumstances. This interpreta-
tion would have significant application to offshore companies, such as
investment funds, whose investors are non-U.S. persons but whose man-
agement decisions are made by U.S. persons.
The term "acting on behalf of or in conjunction with a U.S. person"
in reference to a foreign person is defined by Regulation X to mean, in
pertinent part: "obtaining credit for the purpose of purchasing or carry-
ing a security in which, or in the income or gains or losses from which, a
United States person or a foreign person controlled by a United States
person has a substantial direct or beneficial interest." 8 7 This definition
84 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(2)(A) (1976).
85 Id. § 78g(f(2)(C) (1976).
86 Federal Reserve Board staff letter to Joan Dacey (Feb. 17, 1978).
87 12 C.F.R. § 224.5(a) (1982).
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was added as part of Regulation X, and above all others, has created
difficulty in forecasting what parties are subject to the margin rules.
Neither Regulation X nor written interpretations of Regulation X pro-
vide clear guidance to the definition of the term "direct or indirect" in
this provision or to what constitutes a beneficial interest in a security or
the income or profits thereof or to how substantial that interest should
be. In a letter dated December 8, 1977 the Board's staff provides certain
guidance as to what constitutes a substantial beneficial interest. 8a In that
letter, the Board ruled that a foreign subsidiary of a domestic corpora-
tion (a "United States person"), which proposed to acquire forty percent
of a foreign company in conjunction with the purchase of the remaining
stock by a foreign individual, would have a substantial beneficial interest
in the stock. As a result, the Board concluded that the borrowing by the
foreign individual from a foreign lender would be subject to the margin
rules since a United States person would receive a substantial beneficial
interest. The Board apparently does not regard forty percent as the min-
imum amount which shall constitute a substantial interest; rather, it ap-
pears that the minimum depends on the facts of each particular case.
The letter is significant in that "substantial interest" is measured, at least
in this interpretation of control, in terms of stock ownership. Whether
the ability to elect the board of directors would constitute a substantial
beneficial interest is still unclear. While a tender offer is generally di-
rected at obtaining fifty-one percent of the voting stock, control may be
acquired with a far smaller percentage of stock. In addition, this inter-
pretive letter signals that any joint venture relationship involving a U.S.
person and foreign investors must be reviewed to determine whether any
foreign person is "acting on behalf of or in connection with a 'U.S.
person.' "89
The Board's staff also interprets Regulation X to mean that a loan
by a foreign lender to a foreign corporation for the purpose of acquiring
control of a United States corporation is subject to the margin rules if the
acquired corporation is merged into an existing subsidiary of the foreign
acquiror.90 By deriving benefits from its affiliation with a company lo-
cated in the United States, the foreign entity is deemed to be "acting in
conjunction with a United States person." However, the Board appar-
ently recognizes a narrow exception to this rule and will permit a foreign
corporation to borrow overseas to finance the acquisition of a domestic
corporation and then create a new subsidiary corporation for tax pur-
poses into which the acquired corporation can be merged. 91 This advan-
tage appears useful only in the context of negotiated acquisitions rather
88 Federal Reserve Board staff letter to Jerome W. Jakubik (Dec. 8, 1977) (copy on file in
office of N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.).
89 Id.
90 Letter of July 3, 1980, supra note 81.
91 Federal Reserve Board staff letter to John A. Young (July 24, 1980) (copy on file in
office of N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.).
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than in hostile tender offers where the loan must be negotiated prior to
contemplation of post-acquisition corporate reorganization.
A foreign lender will be subject to the margin rules for credit ob-
tained outside the United States only if Regulation X applies to the bor-
rower. In that event the borrower would be responsible for seeing that
the credit obtained from the lender complies with the applicable margin
regulation.
9 2
VII. Proposed Legislation
Under Regulation X as currently interpreted, the margin rules do
not apply where the acquiror is simply a foreign person borrowing acqui-
sition funds outside the United States from a foreign lender.9 3 In corpo-
rate takeovers, this provides an unfair advantage over United States
investors because of the foreign person's ability to maintain a highly
leveraged position.
In 1981 Congress considered extending the coverage of the margin
rules to govern foreign borrowers who obtain unregulated credit from
foreign lenders to purchase controlling interests in U.S. corporations to
finance corporate takeovers. 94 The proposed legislation generally would
govern those persons borrowing to purchase five percent or more of the
outstanding stock of a U.S. company.9 5
92 Letter of July 3, 1980, supra note 63. See supra discussion accompanying notes 78-80.
93 See Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, 522 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
94 See Senate Hearings, supra note 7.
95 An unclear issue is whether the proposed statute should also govern transactions involv-
ing foreign corporations which are listed on U.S. stock exchanges. One of the questions in-
volved is the proper interpretation of § 30(b) of the 1934 Act, which provides:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd(b) (1981). In Schoebaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), the Second Circuit refused to equate the word "jurisdiction" with
territorial boundaries and applied the 1934 Act to extraterritorial conduct, stating:
We believe Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial applica-
tion in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities
on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the
effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities. In our view,
neither the usual presumption against extraterritorial application of legislation
nor the specific language of Section 30(b) show Congressional intent to preclude
application of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the
United States which are effected outside the United States when extraterritorial
application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors.
405 F.2d at 206. The SEC maintains that the Act is "generally applicable extraterritorially
whenever such application is necessary and appropriate for the protection of American investors
and markets." Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 16, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 208
(2d Cir. 1968). See generally Note, The Internatonal Character of Securities Credit.. A Regulatory Prob-
lem, 2 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 147, 158-64 (1970). The Federal Reserve Board's staff has inter-
preted Regulation X as applying to securities of U.S. corporations listed on a foreign exchange.
Staff letter of October 24, 1982.
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In Senate hearings held to consider extending the margin regula-
tions, testimony focused specifically on the underlying tension resulting
from several attempts by Canadian companies to acquire U.S. corpora-
tions, especially those with oil and natural gas assets. 96 Canada, in turn,
established policies to review acquisitions of Canadian companies by for-
eign investors as well as any transfer of ownership by a foreign company
of its Canadian subsidiary.9 7 In addition, Canadian government invest-
ment policies in the oil and gas field, under which the Government pro-
vided financial assistance to Canadian-owned firms and imposed
limitations on areas of development by foreign-owned firms, further dis-
criminated against U.S. companies. 98 In certain of the takeover attempts
by Canadian firms, the Canadian investment assistance actually pro-
vided an economic basis for the tender offer while the restrictions on
transfer of corporate control had the effect of hampering management
efforts to defend against takeover attempts.99 In response, Congress
sought to restrict the ability of such companies to acquire U.S. corpora-
tions, in part by requiring uniform compliance with the margin
requirements. 100
The Securities and Exchange Commission strongly supported the
legislation, testifying to the problems arising from the use of foreign
sources of credit in the acquisition of securities of domestic corpora-
tions.l0 1 The SEC argued that when a foreign person desires to purchase
U.S. securities or acquire control of U.S. corporations, such person
should not be excused from laws which would apply if the acquiror was a
U.S. person. The SEC emphasized that "the financing of acquisitions
and tender offers, even if concluded wholly outside the United States, is
an activity over which we unquestioriably have jurisdiction."'' 0 2 How-
ever, in a letter dated March 20, 1981, the SEC also alluded to the
problems of applying the margin requirements to the foreign buyer of
U.S. securities rather than to the foreign lender who may be fully in
compliance with applicable foreign law.' 0 3 By imposing the require-
96 Cited as examples were (1) Seagram's attempt to acquire St. Joe Minerals which in
defending itself sold its Canadian energy subsidiary, Can-Del Oil Ltd., Senate Hearings, supra
note 7, at 3-4 (statement of Sen. Don Nickles); (2) Dome Petroleum's foray against Conoco
which culminated in Conoco's sale of its Canadian subsidiary, Hudson Bay Oil Gas, to Dome,
id. at 101; (3) Nu-West's effort to force Cities Services Company to sell its Canadian energy
assets, id.; (4) Seagram's tender offer against Conoco resulting in the merger of Conoco and
DuPont and the acquisition by Texas-Gulf Co. by Elf-Aquitaine, made possible, in part, by Elf-
Aquitaine's agreement with a Canadian corporation, the Canadian Development Company, id.
at 3-4.
97 d. at 28-29 (statement of Harvey Bale, Jr., Assistant U.S. Trade representative for In-
vestment Policy).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 29.
too Id.
1O Id. at 39-53 (statement of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Member, Securities and Exchange
Commission).
102 Id. at 44.
103 Letter from Acting SEC Chairman Philip A. Loomis to Cong. Timothy E. Wirth
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ments on the lender, "possible adverse reaction by foreign governments
arising from their perception that Congress is attempting to extend our
laws to extraterritorial transactions" is minimized. 104
The Federal Reserve Board supported the legislation but with less
enthusiasm, questioning the need for the expanded regulation and the
benefits that would result. In a letter to Senator Harrison Williams
dated July 29, 1981, Federal Reserve Governor Charles Partee supported
the legislation proposed in the House and Senate which place legal re-
sponsibility for compliance upon foreign borrowers rather than lenders.
Speaking on behalf of the Board, Partee stated: "It is our sense that to
subject foreign lending institutions to the margin requirement would un-
necessarily strain relations- between U.S. and foreign financial institu-
tions, would be unworkable, and would risk the threat of unwelcome
retaliatory measures." 10 5 In a letter to Senator D'Amato dated July 8,
1981, Federal Reserve Governor Volcker downplayed the importance of
margin regulations in corporate takeovers, 10 6 noting that the proposed
amendments would not reach all foreign persons buying U.S. stock with
foreign credit. i07 In particular, a foreign investor would be subject to the
Board's margin regulations under the proposed amendment only when
the stock purchase otherwise required filing under section 13(d) or sec-
tion 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act. 10 8 By doing so, the amend-
ments are directed at investors who are purchasing five percent or more
of the outstanding stock of the issuer or who are making a tender offer.
The proposed amendment would not reach ordinary retail investors nor
would it reach most institutional investors making ordinary financial in-
(March 20, 1981), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 55 [hereinafter cited as Loomis
Letter].
104 Id. at 54-60.
105 Letter from Gov. Charles Partee to Sen. Harrison Williams (July 29, 1981).
106 Letter from Gov. Volcker to Sen. D'Amato (July 8, 1981), reprited tn Senate Hearings,
supra note 7, at 24-25.
107 The letter from Governor Volcker stated, in pertinent part:
Both bills are designed to remedy a perceived inequity between domestic and
foreign borrowers who purchase U.S. securities. To the extent that foreign pur-
chasers are borrowing funds from foreign banks or other foreign lenders to finance
corporate takeovers, or purchase substantial amounts of U.S. securities, both bills
would apply to foreign purchasers the margin requirements that presently apply
to U.S. borrowers. We believe it is important to point out, however, that even if
applicable, the Board's margin requirements would probably not have reached
many of the corporate takeovers which have given rise to these bills and similar
bills in the House. Most importantly, the proposed legislation would not reach
corporate takeovers in which credit is not used. Acquisitions financed with corpo-
rate earnings or through an exchange of shares are not subject to the margin
requirements and would, therefore, remain unaffected. Also, if a foreign firm is
large enough, it could probably provide sufficient other collateral or borrow on
an unsecured basis to avoid application of the margin requirements, at least for
the time it would take to file and process the required 13(d) or 14(d) statement
and for the acquisition to be consummated. The Board does not believe margin
requirements, in general, present a significant obstacle to corporate takeovers.
Id.
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vestments. 10 9 Generally, the Federal Reserve Board has been cautious
when considering actions that would impact on foreign banks and their
traditional activities occurring abroad.
The possible drawbacks in extending the margin rules to certain
borrowings by foreign persons from foreign lenders are considerable.
The proposed rule would extend the extraterritorial reach of the securi-
ties laws to govern transactions which occur wholly outside the United
States. The SEC has justified this expansion since the ultimate transac-
tion, that of acquisition of control of a domestic corporation, will have a
substantial impact on the U.S. securities market.t 1° However, if market
impact is the test, then the SEC should seek legislation to regulate acqui-
sitions of securities which produce a market impact. Certain acquisitions
of control may not be financed, and others, as the Board has pointed out,
are often financed on an unsecured basis. In the United States, banks are
subject to strict regulatory jurisdiction and are subject to a review of
their loans, including those which finance tender offers on an unsecured
basis. Outside the United States, however, it would be virtually impossi-
ble to supervise the character of an unsecured loan or to consider the
decision of the lending bank in extending such credit.
Enforcing the margin rules between foreign borrowers and lenders
would be exceedingly difficult. The SEC would have little means of
utilizing its investigatory powers in challenging the accuracy of pur-
ported loan documents. Further, testimony at the Senate hearing ques-
tioned the practicable enforceability of the proposed legislation "given
limits to the staff resources available at the SEC."' I1  The complexity of
the regulatory scheme and the need to devise workable rules in in-
structing foreign lenders as to the necessary compliance increases the dif-
ficulty of enforcement. Further, in many cases, the lender would not be
subject to enforcement of the sanctions available to the SEC.
The need to extend the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. securities
law is less clear in connection with foreign borrowings than in other ex-
traterritorial activities which have a far less direct impact. For instance,
the SEC has focused significant attention to prohibit insider trading by
109 Since ordinary retail investors and institutional investors making ordinary financial in-
vestments are not required to file under § 13(d) or § 14(d) of the 1934 Act, they would not be
subject to the proposed legislation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1976).
110 Loomis Letter, supra note 103, reprtnted n id. at 41-42. In the Senate hearings the SEC
did not raise the relevancy of section 30(b) of the Exchange Act which states:
The provision of this title or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder shall
not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate to prevent evasion of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b). To date, the SEC has not promulgated any rules under this section. It
would seem, however, that any attempt to regulate lending transactions occurring wholly
abroad must address why section 30(b) does not apply.
I11 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 29 (statement of Dr. Harvey Bale, Assistant U.S.
Trade Representative for Investment Policy).
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individuals making use of foreign intermediaries.' 1 2 Only recently has
the Commission examined the ability of foreign investors borrowing
abroad to operate outside the margin regulations.
The congressional purpose of protecting unsophisticated individual
investors seems absent with regard to regulating tender offer financing.
Generally, to the extent that this interpretation of legislative purpose is
still valid, the protection accorded should be extended to individuals,
rather than to sophisticated corporate investors. Unlike individual inves-
tors who may be tempted to speculate when credit is made available, it
would not seem that corporations should be protected from their own
folly. Further, it is unlikely that the small individual investor, whom
Congress arguably intended to protect, would be borrowing abroad.
The degree to which regulation of tender offer financing prevents
market fluctuation is also unclear. The security pledged by an unsuccess-
ful corporate bidder as collateral for the loan usually includes the stock
of the target company and of the would-be acquiror. It is unlikely that
this security would be sold. Typically, with large holdings as collateral,
the pledgee will find either that there is no market for his stock or that
the securities held can be sold only at low prices. Since corporations aim
to maximize investment the only feasible course of action is, in most
cases, to hold the collateral or negotiate with the acquiror for its sale.
Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that tender offer activity to a far
greater degree than individual investment may result in a dramatic in-
crease of stock prices. Whether this rise in prices causes a destablizing
effect, absent the sale of collateral is unclear. In October 1982 the Fed-
eral Reserve Board announced that its staff is conducting a study on the
effectiveness, scope, and structure of federal regulations of margin re-
quirements. 1 3 The Board stated that the margin rules must be re-ex-
amined in light of the changes in the structure of financial markets since
the inception of regulation in 1934.114
The extension of margin regulations to govern borrowings by for-
eign investors from foreign lenders also might inhibit investt.ient in the
United States. Certain foreign investors might be unable to borrow
under the existing compliance standards. Of course, the SEC could ar-
gue that this is in accordance with the intended purpose of restricting the
availability of loans to any investor unable to adequately support its bor-
rowing. However, other foreign investors might react to such regulations
as a direct limitation on major investment in the United States, as well as
an overreaching expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
112 See Thomas Outlines SEC Initiatives to Curb Inside Trading, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
No. 989, at 7-8 (Oct. 20, 1982).
113 See Review of Federal Regulation of Margin Requirements Begins, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 991, at 1-2 (Nov. 3, 1982).
114 Id. at 2.
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VIII. Conclusion
The regulation of margin rules has a history of closing loopholes.
For a foreign investor interested in making a tender offer for a U.S. cor-
poration, loopholes still exist and such investors may attempt to acquire
a controlling interest without being subject to the complex scheme of
margin requirements. However, legislation has been considered which
would require any borrower attempting to finance a cash tender offer to
comply with the margin rules, even if such compliance involves regula-
tion of activities which only involve foreign persons and which occur
wholly abroad. Congressional reaction to attempts by foreign investors
to acquire U.S. companies may result in renewed attempts to pass this
legislation. Yet, it is necessary to balance the competing policy concerns
in viewing the perceived inequities in margin compliance. The relative
intrusion of regulating certain foreign lending and the possibility of de-
terring foreign investment seem to outweigh the importance of extending
the margin rules at a time when the original purpose of such regulations
is being scrutinized.
